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1. Introduction 
 
“The Quest CCS Project could be part of the action Alberta and Canada is looking for – to develop 
valuable oil sands resources with less climate-changing CO2. Quest would capture more than one 
million tonnes of CO2 per year from Shell’s Scotford Upgrader, located near Fort Saskatchewan, 
Alberta. This is the equivalent to taking 175,000 cars off the road. The CO2 would be transported 
safely by pipeline up to 80 kilometers north of the facility to injection wells. It would then be injected 
more than two kilometres underground where it would be permanently and safely secured under 
multiple layers of impermeable geological formations”. “The Scotford upgrading process adds 
hydrogen to the heavy oil to break it down into synthetic crude oil which can then be processed into 
products like gasoline. Producing this hydrogen produces one of the largest sources of CO2 emissions 
from the upgrader”.4 
 
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is generally expected to play a crucial future role in combating 
climate change. For example, J. Edmonds (Joint Global Change Research Institute) puts forward: 
“meeting the low carbon stabilization limits that are being explored in preparation for the IPCC 5th 
Assessment Report are only possible with CCS” (Edmonds, 2008). The main rationale for this view is 
that the economy is still depending on the use of fossil fuels to a large degree and that it might be too 
costly to introduce renewables in the short to medium run. CCS would then offer the opportunity to 
keep on using fossil fuels while limiting the emissions of CO2 into the atmosphere.  
CCS consists of several stages. In the first stage the CO2 is captured5 at point sources, mainly at coal-
fired or natural gas-fired power plants, but, as illustrated above, also in the upgrading process of tar 
oil. For this several technologies are available, including post-combustion capture, pre-combustion 
capture (oxidizing fossil fuel) and oxy-fuel combustion. In the second phase the CO2 is transported to 
a reservoir, where in the third phase the captured carbon is stored in for example deep geological 
formations. A side effect of the latter could be the use of captured carbon for increasing the pressure in 
oil fields, thereby reducing the cost of future extraction, but at the same time increasing the 
profitability of enhanced oil extraction, with the subsequent release of carbon, unless captured. As a 
fourth phase there is monitoring what is going on, once CO2 is in the ground. Each of these phases 
brings along costs. The economic attractiveness of capture depends on the cost of capture and storage 
and the climate change damage prevented by mitigation of emissions of carbon. Herzog (2011) and 
Hamilton et al. (2009) provide estimates of these costs and conclude that the capture cost are about 
$52 per metric ton avoided (from supercritical pulverized coal power plants), whereas for 
transportation and storage the costs will be in the range of $5-$15 per metric ton CO2 avoided. This 
                                                          
4 http://www.shell.ca/home/content/can-
en/aboutshell/our_business_tpkg/business_in_canada/upstream/oil_sands/quest/about_quest/ 
5 Herzog (2011) points out that already decades ago capture took place, but then the objective was to enhance oil 
recovery by injecting CO2 in order to increase the pressure in the well.  
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leads to overall costs amounting to $60-$65 per metric ton. These numbers are more or less confirmed 
in ZEP (2011). The International Energy Agency (2011) reviews several studies concerned with 
technologies used on a large scale and finds cost per metric CO2 avoided $55 on average for coal-fired 
plants and $80 for gas-fired power plants6. At the present state of climate change policy CCS is 
obviously not profitable, but with a carbon price at present of $25 and rising by 4% per year, large 
scale CCS becomes a serious option before 2040. Nevertheless numerous obstacles remain. Many 
questions are still unresolved. Some are of a regulatory and legal nature, for example the rights-of-way 
for pipelines7, access to the formation where CO2 is injected8, and how to make the transition from 
capture megatons in the present to capture gigatons in the future in order to have capture at a level that 
is substantial enough to combat climate change. Moreover, in Europe the success of CCS also depends 
of the prevailing CO2 permit price, which at present is low, and has induced Eon and GDF Suez to 
postpone investments in an EU funded demonstration project near Rotterdam, The Netherlands.  
In the present paper we address not so much the development of the CCS technology but the optimal 
use of the technology once it is available. We only look at capture at point sources, and thereby 
abstract from geo-engineering, where carbon is captured from the atmosphere. We also assume that a 
storage technology is available, but cannot be utilized for making fossil fuel reserves accessible at 
lower cost. Actually, we don’t take into account the necessity of (costly) storage capacity that might be 
limited (see e.g., Lafforgue et al., 2008a and 2008b). We consider both exhaustibility and non-
exhaustibility of fossil fuels. BP(2013) estimates that world proved natural gas reserves at the end of 
2012, 6,614 trillion cubic feet, are sufficient to meet 56 years of production. Roughly the same holds 
for oil. For coal the global reserves-to-production ratio is much higher: 109 years. Since climate 
change is an issue that needs to be addressed in the long term, the assumption of exhaustibility seems 
warranted, even for coal. However, one could argue that the technically recoverable amounts of gas 
and coal are much higher and that large part of it will become economically viable due to higher prices 
or extraction lower costs. For example, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2013) estimates 
the technically recoverable amount of gas are huge: 25,000 trillion cubic feet, of which around 30% is 
shale gas. Given the fact that backstop technologies are becoming cheaper over time, we account for 
the possibility that not all recoverable resources will be used up, so that from an economic perspective 
exhaustibility is not taking place. 
 
The criterion for optimality that we use is discounted utilitarianism with instantaneous welfare being 
the difference between utility from energy use on the one hand and the capture cost and the damage 
arising from accumulated CO2 in the atmosphere on the other hand. In addressing optimality one 
                                                          
6 Remarkably, the costs for a project in China are much lower 
7 See N. Jaakkola (2012) for problems that may arise in case of imperfect competition on the transportation 
network (offshore, in northwestern Europe).   
8 Feenstra et al. (2010) report on the public outcry when plans for storage in the village of Barendrecht (The 
Netherlands) were revealed.  
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needs to simultaneously determine optimal capture and storage of CO2. We make a distinction 
between constant marginal capture cost and increasing marginal capture costs (with marginal capture 
costs at zero capture zero or positive). Along the optimum a tradeoff has to be made between the direct 
instantaneous welfare of using fossil fuel on the one hand and the cost of capture and damage caused 
by the accumulated CO2 on the other. It is found that different assumptions on capture and storage 
cost lead to considerable differences in the combined optimal capture and storage and extraction 
regime, in the case of abundant fossil fuel reserves as well as when reserves are limited. We identify 
cases where in the presence of the CCS it is still optimal to let the CO2 stock increase before partial 
capture takes place. The core of the paper is section 4 where we derive the optimum for the pivotal 
case of a finite resource stock and the availability of a CCS technology. There we show that, perhaps 
surprisingly, it might be optimal to have full capture initially, then partial capture while keeping the 
CO2 stock constant, and a final phase with no capture but in which the CO2 stock increases initially, 
before decreasing eventually. Hence the CO2 stock is not inverted U-shaped, as in Tahvonen (1997). 
In addition to CCS we introduce adaptation as a possible strategy to tackle the climate change 
problem. Adaptation is concerned with reducing or eliminating climate change induced 
damages once they occur. Examples of adaptive measures include, the construction of dykes to 
prevent flooding as a consequence of rising sea levels, and the development of crop varieties that are 
immune to pathogens that are likely to flourish with changes in certain climate characteristics. It will 
be shown that this option may lead to postponing CCS, at least CCS at the maximum rate. 
 
 The related literature is large. First of all there is the literature that highlights the interrelationship 
between the use of fossil fuels and climate change (see Plourde (1972), D’Arge and Kogiku (1973), 
Ulph and Ulph (1994), Withagen (1994), Hoel and Kverndokk (1996), for early contributions). 
Recently this literature was enriched by explicitly introducing backstop technologies (see e.g., Tsur 
and Zemel (2003, 2005)) with due attention to the Green Paradox, the problem that may arise if for 
political economy reasons an optimal carbon tax is infeasible and policy makers rely on a subsidy of 
the renewable (see e.g. Van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012a and 2012b)). Another step has been set by 
explicitly incorporating CCS in models with non-renewable natural resources. We start by sketching 
two recent contributions by Amigues et al. (2012 and 2013), who give a nice up to date survey of the 
state of affairs and offer a generalization of Chakravorty et al. (2006) and Lafforgue et al. (2008). 
These papers come close to ours in several respects but at the same time our discussion serves to 
highlight the essence of our work. Amigues et al. assume that there is a finite stock of fossil fuel, that 
can be extracted at constant marginal cost. In our case extraction is costless. This is without loss of 
generality, as the results also hold for constant average extraction costs. They also assume the 
existence of a backstop technology that is produced at constant marginal cost, which may be high or 
low. The backstop is perfectly malleable with the extracted fossil fuel and yields utility, together with 
fossil fuel. We abstract from a backstop technology, but we shall argue that in the case of abundant 
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fossil fuel reserves capture essentially functions as a backstop. Net accumulation of CO2 is the 
difference between on the one hand emissions, resulting from burning fossil fuel minus the amount 
captured and stored, and, on the other hand, the natural decay of the stock of CO2, which is a constant 
fraction of the existing stock. The average cost of capture may take several forms. It may depend just 
on the amount captured, but, alternatively, one could allow for learning or for scarcity effects. In the 
former case the average CCS cost is a decreasing function of amount already captured. The latter case 
captures the fact that with more CCS done in the past it gets more difficult to find new CO2 deposits. 
We don’t allow for stock dependent storage costs, but we do look at different capture cost 
constellations. Since we concentrate on capture at point sources and not on capture from the 
atmosphere, net emissions are bound to be non-negative. Apart from the cost aspect, a major 
difference is in the assumption regarding damages. Amigues et al. put an upper bound, sometimes 
called a ceiling, on the accumulated CO2 stock, whereas we allow for the stock to take any value in 
principle, but work with a strictly convex damage function. Conceptually a damage function is more 
appealing, because it can be constructed in such a way that it includes the ceiling, by taking the 
damage function almost flat until just before the presupposed ceiling is reached, from where on 
damage increases steeply. More importantly, Amigues at al. (2012 and 2013) show that for all 
specifications considered it is optimal not to start with CCS until the threshold is reached. But the 
main and usual motivation for choosing a ceiling is that it represents a threshold beyond which a 
catastrophe takes place. Given the many uncertainties surrounding the phenomenon of climate change, 
this evokes the question whether it is optimal indeed to capture only at the critical level. One of the 
objectives of the present paper is to investigate this in detail. Our finding is that it might be optimal to 
do partial CCS at some threshold level, keeping the stock at this level. But after such a phase, the CO2 
stock might increase for a while, without CCS taking place. 
Other papers addressing CCS include Amigues et al. (2014) and Coulomb and Henriet (2010), who 
both acknowledge that demand for fossil fuel derives from different sectors of the economy. For 
example, one sector is the electricity production sector, whereas the other is the transport sector. In the 
latter capture is far less attractive than in the former. Also in these papers, a ceiling on the CO2 stock 
is exogenously imposed and capture only takes place at the ceiling in the most likely scenarios. We 
assume away the existence of a backstop in order to highlight these innovative aspects. Essentially our 
model is a simple theoretical Integrated Assessment Model of CCS, that also allows for an optimal 
carbon tax rule representing the social cost of carbon.  
The outline of the paper is as follows. We set up the model in section 2. Section 3 deals with the case 
of an abundant resource, whereas section 4 treats the case of a limited resource. Section 5 deals with 
the interpretation of CCS as a backstop and shows how adaptation can be incorporated into the model. 
Section 6 concludes. 
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2. The model and preliminary results. 
In this section we introduce the formal model and provide some first results. 
 
2.1 The model and necessary conditions for optimality. 
The social planner maximizes societal welfare, composed of three elements, represented in a separable 
way. First there is the utility of consuming a commodity produced from a non-renewable natural 
resource, such as fossil fuel. The second element consists of the cost of capture. Finally, there is the 
damage from the accumulated stock of pollutants. Social welfare is given by 
[ ]
0
( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))te u x t c a t h Z t dtρ
∞
− − −∫  
The rate of fossil fuel use is )(tx . Extraction cost is zero. Fossil fuel use yields instantaneous utility 
))(( txu . Capture is denoted by ( )a t , which brings along a cost ( ( ))c a t . The stock of accumulated 
CO2  is )(tZ  causing damage ( ( )).h Z t  Damage appears directly in the social welfare function. 
Alternatively, damage occurs in production (Nordhaus, 2008, and Rezai et al., 2012), but here  
production is not represented by an explicit production function so that the direct approach is 
appropriate. Finally, ρ  is the constant rate of pure time preference, assumed positive. Regarding the 
functions involved we make the following assumptions. 
 
Assumption 1. 
Instantaneous gross surplus u  is strictly increasing, strictly concave and satisfies 
( ) ( )
0
lim '  and lim ' 0
xx
u x u x
→∞↓
= ∞ = .  
 
Assumption 2. 
The damage function h  is assumed strictly increasing and strictly convex and satisfies 
( )0 0h = , ( )
0
lim ' 0
Z
h Z
↓
=  and ( )lim ' .
Z
h Z
→∞
= ∞  
 
Assumption 3. 
The capture cost function c  is strictly increasing and convex. 
 
We allow for different alternative properties within the class defined in this assumption: linear capture 
costs, as well as strictly convex capture costs (with zero or positive marginal costs at zero capture).  
The accumulation of CO2 is described by 
(1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0, 0 .Z t x t a t Z t Z Zζ α= − − =  
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Here 0Z  is the given initial CO2 stock. The flow of generated CO2 is ( ).x tζ  Net emissions are then 
( ) ( ).x t a tζ −  Decay of atmospheric CO2  is linear at a constant and positive rate .α  This is an heroic 
assumption9. Let )(tX  denote the stock of fossil fuel time t  and denote the initial stock by 0.X  Then  
(2) 0( ) ( ), (0) .X t x t X X= − =  
(3) ( ) 0.X t ≥  
Since marginal utility goes to infinity as consumption of fossil fuel goes to zero, we don’t mention the 
non-negativity constraint on fossil fuel extraction explicitly. A distinguishing feature of our approach 
is that we don’t allow for capture CO2 from the atmosphere. Hence, only current emissions can be 
abated. The idea is that CO2 capture at electricity power plants is far less costly than capture CO2 
from transportation, for example. So, in addition to non-negativity of capture we impose non-
negativity of net emissions. 
(4) ( ) 0.a t ≥  
(5) ( ) ( ) 0.x t a tζ − ≥  
In the sequel we omit the time argument where there is no danger of confusion. The current-value 
Lagrangian corresponding with maximizing social welfare reads 
( , , , , , , , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] [ ] [ ].a xa a xaL Z X x a u x c a h Z x a Z x a x aλ µ γ γ λ ζ α µ γ γ ζ= − − − − − + − + + −   
Here λ  is the shadow cost of pollution and µ  is the shadow value of the stock of fossil fuels. The 
latter vanishes in case of an abundant resource. In addition to equations (1)-(5) we have as necessary 
conditions 
(6) :0=
∂
∂
x
L
'( ) ( ).xau x µ ζ λ γ= + −  
(7) :0=
∂
∂
a
L '( ) .xa ac aλ γ γ= + −  
(8) 0, 0, 0.a aa aγ γ= ≥ ≥  
(9) [ ] 0, 0, 0.xa xax a x aγ ζ γ ζ− = ≥ − ≥  
(10) : .L
X
µ ρµ µ ρµ
∂
= − + =
∂
   
(11) : ( ) '( ).L h Z
Z
λ ρλ λ ρ α λ
∂
= − = + −
∂
   
(12) [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] 0 as .te t Z t t X t tρ λ µ− + → →∞  
                                                          
9 The process of decay is  more complicated in reality, because of all kinds of possible feedbacks and because 
part of the CO2 stock stays in the atmosphere indefinitely. See Farzin and Tahvonen (1996) for an early 
economic contribution, basing themselves on Maier-Raimer and Hasselman (1987). For more recent work, see 
Archer (2005), Archer et al. (2009) and Allen et al. (2009). For a recent discussion of the carbon cycle and its 
potential consequences for economic policy, see Amigues and Moreaux (2013) and Gerlagh and Liski (2012).  
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Conditions (6)-(9) are necessary and sufficient to maximize the Hamiltonian with respect to fossil fuel 
use and capture, yielding that marginal benefits from capture equal marginal cost, if capture is taking 
place. Equations (10) and (11) are the usual no-arbitrage conditions. Finally, equation (12) is the 
transversality condition. Note that, taking into account the transversality condition, λ  can be written 
as: ( ) ( )( ) '( ( ))t s
t
t e e h Z s dsα ρ α ρλ
∞
+ − += ∫ . This is the social cost of carbon, the cost of all future marginal 
damages due to an increase of emissions at instant of time t .  
 
3. CCS available, abundant resource. 
In this section we describe the optimum in the presence of an abundant fossil fuel stock. The results 
that we obtain are novel, to the best of our knowledge, but still the present analysis mainly serves to 
highlight in Section 4 the effect of scarcity, which is the main contribution this paper aims to make.  
Define *Z  by 
* *'( )'( )Z h Zu α ζ
ζ α ρ
=
+
10. By virtue of the assumptions made *Z  exists. Actually, *Z  is the 
(globally stable) steady state of the economy without the CCS option. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE  
 
Suppose the economy finds itself in *Z  and 
*'( ) '(0)h Z c
α ρ
<
+
. Note that this inequality means that the 
social cost of carbon, evaluated at the constant *Z , is smaller than the marginal cost of reducing 
emissions, so that carbon capture is too expensive and no capture is needed if the economy initially 
finds itself in *0Z Z=  and would stay there or would get smaller over time. It is indeed optimal to take 
* *
* * '( )( ) , ( ) 0, ( )Z h Zx t x a t tα λ λ
ζ α ρ
= ≡ = = ≡
+
 for all 0t ≥ . All the necessary conditions are satisfied, 
and they are sufficient as well.  
What is optimal for an initial CO2 stock 0Z  smaller than 
*Z ? Since the CO2 stock is the only state 
variable, it is monotonic. If the stock would decrease at some instant of time, it would decrease 
forever. This implies that no capture will take place. Moreover, for a decreasing CO2 stock we would 
then have *( )x t Zζ α<  always, so that the marginal utility of consumption is larger than marginal 
damages 
*'( )'( ( )) h Zu x t ζ
α ρ
>
+
 This is clearly suboptimal. Hence, for low initial CO2 stocks it is optimal 
to let the stock increase up to *Z . 
                                                          
10 Appendix A contains a list of critical values of atmospheric CO2. 
9 
 
If the initial CO2 stock is slightly higher than *Z , it is optimal to have no capture at all. The economy 
is governed by two equations describing the development of the CO2 stock and the social cost of 
carbon, equations (1) and (11), where in (11) we have 0a =  and x  is a function of λ  in view of 
'( )u x ζλ= . We can then determine the highest initial CO2 stock for which this regime is optimal. The 
path has to end up in the steady state * *( , )Z λ  and initially the social cost of carbon must equal '(0)c . 
This requires a particular initial value of the CO2 stock, that is denoted by hZ . If the actual initial 
CO2 stock is larger than hZ  there will typically prevail a regime with partial capture. In that case we 
have (1) and (11) again with '( )c aλ =  and '( )u x ζλ= , giving both a  and x  as functions of .λ  The 
path has to end in ( , ) ( , '(0))hZ Z cλ =  and it must start at ( , ) ( , )m mZ Zλ λ=  where mλ  satisfies 
'( ) '( / ) mu x u a ζ ζλ= =  because at the outset of this period capture is maximal. Finally, for values 
0
mZ Z>  we have full capture. Note that with linear capture cost there cannot be partial capture, 
because that would require a constant social cost of carbon, and thereby a constant CO2 stock.  
 
Next, we look into the case where 
*'( ) '(0)h Z c
α ρ
≥
+
, so that we may say that capture is cheap. There exist 
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( , , , )Z a xλ  with ˆ 0a ≥ , such that 
ˆ ˆ ˆ'( ) ˆˆ ˆ ˆ'( ), '( ) '( ) '( ).h Z Z ac a u x u c aα λ
α ρ ζ
+
= = = =
+
 Hence, if the economy 
finds itself initially in 0 ˆZ Z= , it is optimal to stay there with partial capture if ˆ 0a >  or no capture if 
ˆ 0a = . Typically, it is optimal to have partial capture in a region surrounding this steady state if ˆ 0a > . 
As before, it is possible to determine ˆmZ Z>  such that for 0 mZ Z≤  it is optimal to have partial 
capture throughout, and for 0
mZ Z>  full capture is required initially. Starting at 0
mZ Z=  we must 
have (0) mλ λ=  defined by '( ) '( / ) '( ) mu x u a c aζ ζ ζλ= = = . Similarly, there exists ˆaZ Z<  such that 
for 0
aZ Z≤  zero capture prevails, whereas for 0
aZ Z Z≥ >  partial capture is in order. At 0
aZ Z=  the 
initial social cost of carbon and the initial rate of consumption are determined by '( ) '(0).a au x cλ= =  A 
typical phase diagram is presented in figure 2.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE  
 
We end this section with two remarks.  
1. With constant marginal CCS cost there is only partial capture in ˆZ Z= . Hence, in that case 
ˆa mZ Z Z= = . Also a discontinuity occurs in the capture rate at the steady state stock. 
2. With strictly convex CCS cost and '(0) 0c = , there is capture throughout, so that 0aZ = .  
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4. Optimal capture with a finite resource stock 
4.1 General approach 
Here we consider a finite fossil fuel stock. Tahvonen (1997) studies a world with a finite resource 
stock as well, but without CCS11. Nevertheless his work presents an important benchmark since his 
assumptions on instantaneous utility and damages are equivalent to ours. For the sake of notation we 
denote variables of the Tahvonen economy by the superscript T . A first property of the optimum in 
his model is that, given the initial resource stock, for a low enough initial CO2 stock the shadow price 
of CO2 ( Tλ ) is inverted U-shaped over time, whereas otherwise, it is monotonically decreasing. 
Second, given the initial resource stock, for a low enough initial CO2 stock the CO2 stock is inverted 
U-shaped over time, and monotonically decreasing otherwise. The intuition is that with a low initial 
CO2 stock marginal damages from pollution are low compared to the marginal utility of consumption, 
so that it is in the interest of welfare to consume a lot of fossil fuel initially, at the cost of a higher 
pollution stock. The possibility of non-monotonicity constitutes a relevant difference with the model 
with an abundant resource where the shadow price and the atmospheric CO2 are monotonic. In our 
analysis we need a related result, still in Tahvonen’s setting without CCS, namely that, starting with a 
small initial CO2 stock, *0Z Z< , the CO2 stock will initially rise if the resource stock is large enough, 
and the other way around. The reason is simple. Suppose there exists *0Z Z<  such that for all 0X  we 
have 0(0) /
Tx Zα ζ< , so that in the Tahvonen economy the CO2 stock decreases initially. Then it 
decreases forever, as demonstrated by Tahvonen, implying from (11) that 0'( )(0)T h Zλ
α ρ
≤
+
. It follows 
from (6) that 00
'( )(0) '( (0)) (0) '( / )T T T h Zu x u Z ζµ ζλ α ζ
α ρ
= + > +
+
. The right hand side of this expression 
is bounded away from zero, so that the present value shadow price of the resource stock is positive, 
implying that the initial stock 0X  is finite, a contradiction. Since the extraction rate is continuous over 
time, it is clear that with a small initial resource stock, it cannot be optimal to have an initial increase 
of the CO2 stock. Then the claim follows from a continuity argument.  
 
We are now ready to move on to the core of the present paper, which is the full characterization of the 
optimum in a variety of relevant cases. It turns out to be convenient to define Z  by 
'(0) '( ) /( )c h Z ρ α= + . This will be called the break even CO2 stock, since if atmospheric CO2 would 
always be above this level, it would pay to capture, whereas if the atmospheric CO2 stock would 
always be below this level, it would be optimal not to use the CCS technology at all.  
 
                                                          
11 Tahvonen (1997) allows for a backstop technology and for stock dependent extraction cost. In describing 
Tahvonen’s contribution we abstract from these issues, because we don’t have them in our model.  
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4.2 Constant marginal capture cost 
We first assume that capture is cheap, so that *'(0) '( ) /( ) '( ) /( )c c h Z h Zρ α ρ α= = + < + . The optimum 
is depicted in figure 3, which gives the optimal trajectories in ( , )Z X  space.  
Several cases are to be considered. 
1. Suppose 0Z Z=  , the break even CO2 stock. In the absence of CCS and with an abundant 
resource the CO2 stock monotonically increases from 0Z Z=   to the steady state 
*Z , as we have seen 
in figure 1. With a finite resource stock, we are in the Tahvonen (1997) economy. As explained above, 
there exists a threshold level, denoted by TX , such that if 0Z Z=   and 0
TX X<   the CO2 stock 
monotonically decreases along the optimum, whereas if 0
TX X>   the CO2 stock initially increases 
and after some instant of time it decreases. If 0
TX X≤   then (0)T cλ <  because TZ  is decreasing and 
will therefore always be below Z  so that  
( )
0
(0) ( '( ( )) '( )) 0T s Tc e h Z s h Z dsρ αλ
∞
− +− = − <∫  . 
Hence, there exists another threshold level MW TX X>  , such that (0)T cλ =  if 0Z Z=

 and 
0 .
MWX X=   Stated otherwise, if in the model without CCS the initial resource stock would be MWX  
and the initial CO2 stock would be Z  then discounted damages incurred along the optimum, would 
equal c . Indeed MW TX X>   because otherwise ( )TZ t Z≤   for all 0t ≥  and hence (0) .T cλ <  We will 
denote the stable branch in Z X−  space, passing through ( , )MWZ X   and leading to ( , ) (0,0)Z X =  by 
D. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Suppose 0
MWX X=  . It is then optimal to have zero capture forever. The optimum is just the optimum 
of the Tahvonen economy, starting from the same initial state. So, it is optimal to stay on the curve D. 
By construction (0) (0)T cλ λ= =  and ( ) ( ) 0Tt tλ λ= <   for all 0t > . All the necessary conditions are 
satisfied and these conditions are sufficient as well.  
Suppose next that 0
MWX X<  . Then it is optimal again to follow the Tahvonen optimal program 
again, without any use of CCS. 
Suppose 0
MWX X>  . The optimum now consists of two phases. A first phase has partial capture. 
Along this phase the CO2 stock remains constant at the Z  level. The resource stock is reduced until 
( ) MWX T X=   at some instant of time 0T ≥ . The path follows the curve denoted by E in figure 3. 
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After T  we are in the Tahvonen economy with the property that the CO2 stock will first increase and 
then decrease. We should also have ( ) 0.a T =  Hence, the transition occurs in a smooth way. Along an 
interval with partial capture, the capture rate and resource use are both monotonically decreasing, as 
can be seen from (6), with xa cλ γ− =  so that x  decreases, and from (1) with Z  constant and x  
decreasing. Hence, the timing of the transition will guarantee continuity.  
2. Suppose 0 .Z Z<   If the initial state of the economy 0 0( , )Z X  is to the left of the part of curve D 
that leads to ( , )MWZ X  , the Tahvonen program is optimal. If the initial state is to the right of that part, 
it is optimal to have an initial period of time with zero capture, then a period of time with partial 
capture, moving along E, and a final interval of time, starting at ( , )MWZ X  ), with zero capture again, 
following D from the moment of the transition on.  
3. To describe the optimal trajectories for the remaining initial stocks we introduce two 
additional dividing curves, denoted by F and G in figure 3.  
Loosely speaking, the curve F is the locus of stocks such that in a regime with full abatement the 
economy exactly reaches ( , )MWZ X  . Hence, suppose ( ', ')Z X  is on F. Consider Z Zα= − . With 
0 'Z Z Z= >   we can determine the instant of time 'T  where ( ') .Z T Z=   From 'T  on, we have zero 
capture, and full exhaustion of the resource stock. This determines the shadow price (0)µ . Before 'T  
we have '( ( )) (0) tu x t e cρµ ζ= + , since .xa cλ γ− =  Hence we can uniquely determine 'X  from 
'
0
( ) '
T
MWx t dt X X= −∫  .  
The curve G is the locus of stock values such that for initial stock above G there is full CCS, whereas 
below G no CCS is taking place. Obviously, one point of G is ( , )MWZ X  . Moreover, for a very high 
initial CO2 stock and a small resource stock there will be full CCS. Hence, G is decreasing from high 
Z  and low X  to ( , )MWZ X  . It needs to be shown that the decrease is monotonic. This can be seen as 
follows. Suppose that G is non-monotonic. Then there exists 1,Z  1X  and 2X  with 2 1X X> such that 
1 1( , )Z X  as well as 1 2( , )Z X  are on G. From 0 0 1 1( , ) ( , )Z X Z X=  as well as from 0 0 1 2( , ) ( , )Z X Z X=  it is 
optimal to have zero CCS forever. On G we have cλ = . Moreover, with 1 1( , )Z X  corresponds a higher 
(0)µ  than with 1 2( , )Z X  because fossil fuel is scarcer. But that implies that on the path originating 
from 1 1( , )Z X  there is less extraction initially, so that the CO2 stock grows less fast and the shadow 
price 1λ  grows faster. This will reinforce less extraction and lower CO2 accumulation, contradicting 
that total discounted damages should be the same, since 1 2(0) (0).λ λ=  
Thus we may conclude as follows. 
 
Proposition 1. 
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Suppose constant marginal CCS cost ( ( )c a ca= ) and a cheap capture technology Then, when 
0 0( , )Z X  lies: 
-within zone 1, below and to the left of D and G, it is optimal to never capture CO2. 
-within zone 2, between G and F, it is optimal first to fully capture and next, once a point on the locus 
G is attained, to stop capture forever. 
-within zone 3, between F and E, it is optimal first to fully capture in order to reduce the CO2 stock to 
the level Z , next switch to a partial capture policy, maintaining the CO2 stock at this level until the 
instant of time where the resource stock has been reduced to MWX , from where on capture is no longer 
necessary. 
-within zone 4, between E and D, no capture is required initially and the CO2 stock increases up to the 
level Z , which, once attained, is maintained for a while thanks to a partial capture policy, capture 
being given up forever once the resource stock has been reduced to MWX .  
 
We now move to the case of an expensive capture technology: *Z Z> . Partial capture is excluded 
then. The reason is that with partial capture we have ,Z Z cλ λ= = = . Hence, with partial CCS we 
would have 0 0'( ) '( ) / ( ) '( / ),
t tu x e c e h Z u Zρ ρµ ζ µ ζ α ρ α ζ= + = + + <   which is incompatible with 
*Z Z>  since * *'( ) / ( ) '( / )h Z u Zζ α ρ α ζ+ = .  
If 0Z Z<   .then there is zero capture forever. The reason is that full use of CCS, (0) (0)a xζ= , would 
imply (0) .cλ ≥  Then, the co-state λ  is increasing and it will never decrease. Hence there will be full 
capture forever, which is suboptimal. So, it is optimal now to follow the Tahvonen economy, as is to 
be expected if the initial stock is below the break-even stock.  
If 0Z Z>   and if we would start with zero capture, then CSS will never be used, because the co-state λ  
monotonically decreases. This occurs if the initial resource stock is small. But, with a large initial 
resource stock and a large initial CO2 stock, it is optimal to have an initial interval of time with full 
capture, followed by an interval of zero capture. Hence, another frontier exists between starting with 
full or zero capture. 
 
Proposition 2. 
Suppose constant marginal CCS cost ( ( )c a ca= ) and an expensive capture technology. Then there 
exists a critical level of the CO2 stock, larger than Z , and decreasing with the resource endowment 
0X , such that: 
-for initial CO2 stocks smaller than the critical level there is zero capture forever. 
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-for initial CO2 stocks larger than the critical level it is optimal to have full capture initially, before 
switching to a zero capture policy forever. 
 
Remark 
If climate change damages are incorporated in the model, not by means of a damage function in the 
social preferences but though a ceiling: ( )Z t Z≤ , then only necessary condition (11) changes. It 
becomes  
(11’) ( )λ ρ α λ π= + −
 
where ( ) 0, ( )[ ( )] 0t t Z Z tπ π≥ − = . In the case of constant marginal capture cost capture only takes 
place at the ceiling. Indeed, suppose that at some instant of time we have ( )Z t Z<  and ( ) 0a t > . Then 
( ) 0tπ =  and ( ) ( ) ( )t tλ ρ α λ= + , implying that λ  is increasing. Since ( ) ( )xat c tλ γ= +  it follows that 
0xaγ >  and increasing, so that there is full capture and the CO2 stock declines. This process goes on, 
and the threshold will never be reached. Moreover, consumption and capture both go to zero as time 
goes to infinity, whereas positive consumption, bounded away from zero, is feasible. Hence, there will 
only be capture at the ceiling. This poses a danger, if the ceiling is motivated by interpreting it as a 
threshold level, beyond which a catastrophe occurs and if there is uncertainty regarding the effect of 
capture. More importantly, our model without the ceiling allows for much more complex behaviour of 
the CO2 stock, as outlined in proposition 1. 
 
4.3 Strictly convex capture cost with '(0) 0c =  
In this section we consider increasing marginal capture cost, with zero marginal cost at zero capture. 
Contrary to the case of constant marginal capture cost there will always be some CO2 capture. 
Actually, it could even be optimal to have full capture indefinitely. The reason is that, because of the 
limited availability of the resource, the rate of extraction is necessarily becoming smaller over time, so 
that the effort needed to capture all emitted CO2 gets smaller over time as well, and therefore may be 
worthwhile. Let us study this possibility in some detail. In case of permanent full capture we have 
( ) ( )x t a tζ =  for all 0t ≥ . Also ( ) '( ( )) ( )xat c a t tλ γ= +  for all 0t ≥  from (7) and (8). Hence, from 
(6), 0'( ( )) '( ( ))
tu x t e c x tρµ ζ ζ= +  for all 0t ≥ . Therefore, the extraction rate x  is a function of time 
and the shadow price 0µ . It is monotonically decreasing over time. The resource constraint 
0
0
( )x t dt X
∞
=∫  uniquely determines 0µ . Consequently, also ( )x t  and ( )a t  are determined for all 0t ≥  
and capture is monotonically decreasing. Moreover, with full capture from the start 
( ) ( )
0( ) '( )
t s s
t
t e e h Z e dsρ α ρ α αλ
∞
+ − + −= ∫
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for all 0t ≥ . In order for permanent full capture to be optimal it must hold that ( ) 0xa tγ ≥  for all 0t ≥ . 
It is easy to construct an example where this condition is satisfied. Consider the following functions: 
2 1 21 1
2 2( ) , ( ) /(1 ), ( ) ,c a ca u x x h Z bZ
η η−= = − =  where 0, 0c b> >  and 1η ≠  are constants. Then, in 
the proposed optimum we have 0( ) /( 2 )
tt bZ e αλ ρ α−= + . Moreover, ( ) / ( ) /x t x t ρ η→ −  as t →∞  
and in the limit ( )c a  will behave as ( / )te ρ η− . If 0Z  is large enough and /α ρ η<  there will always be 
full capture, because '( ) xa ac aλ γ γ= + −  so that ( ) 0xa tγ >  for all 0t > . Intuitively this makes sense: 
with a high initial pollution stock, low decay and a large rate of time preference it is optimal to get rid 
of pollution as soon as possible, and there is not much care for the future. We conclude that it is well 
possible to have full capture forever. This occurs for high initial pollution stocks and low decay rates.  
Next the question arises in what circumstances there will always be partial capture. Along any interval 
of time with partial capture the following holds: 
0'( ( )) '( ( ))
tu x t e c a tρµ ζ= + , 
( ) '( ( )),t c a tλ =  
( )( ) ( ) '( ( )),t t h Z tλ α ρ λ= + −  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).Z t x t a t Z tζ α= − −  
For a small initial resource stock the shadow price will be high ( 0µ  high). Hence, with a large initial 
CO2 stock, and therefore a high initial shadow price (0)λ , it is definitely not optimal to start with 
partial capture, because it follows from the first two equations that net emissions will be negative then. 
So, in order to have partial capture throughout the initial pollution stock should not be too large and 
the resource stock should not be too small. Hence, to conclude, we state  
 
Proposition 3. 
Suppose capture costs are strictly convex with '(0) 0.c =   
There will always be some CO2 capture. Full capture throughout is warranted for high initial CO2 
stocks and low decay rates. Partial capture throughout is in order for a low initial CO2 stock and a 
relatively large resource stock. 
 
4.4 Strictly convex capture cost with '(0) 0c >  
With increasing marginal capture cost the optimal pattern of capture takes four possible forms, which 
are summarized in  
 
Proposition 4. 
Suppose capture costs are strictly convex with '(0) 0.c >  
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For high enough 0Z  it is optimal to have an initial phase with full capture. Then follows a phase with 
partial capture, and a final phase with zero capture. 
For intermediate levels of 0Z  the optimal sequence is: zero capture, then partial capture and finally 
zero capture, with the first phase possibly degenerate. 
For low levels of 0Z  it is optimal to have zero capture throughout. 
Proof 
It has been shown before that full capture can only occur at the outset of the planning period. Given 
that the marginal capture cost at zero capture is bounded away from zero, there should be no capture 
eventually. From full capture there is no transition possible to zero capture, because that would violate 
the continuity of the co-state λ . Clearly, for high initial CO2 stocks one should start with full capture. 
For low initial values of the CO2 stock, we are in the Tahvonen world where capture is not needed. 
For intermediate initial CO2 stocks it is optimal to build up the stock first, and then to have partial 
capture. Q.E.D. 
 
5. Backstops and adaptation. 
CCS helps to prevent or reduce emissions into the atmosphere. We first show that CCS can be 
interpreted as a backstop technology. Secondly, we demonstrate how the model can be extended so as 
to incorporate adaptation. 
 
Economically and mathematically, the problem that we have considered thus far is essentially 
equivalent to the optimal use of a costly backstop technology. If we define /y x a ζ= +  as total 
consumption, partly originating from the natural resource, x , and partly from a backstop, a , properly 
scaled, and if the cost of producing the backstop is given by ( )c a , then we have utility ( )u y  and 
accumulation of pollution is given by ( )Z y a Zζ α= − − . Hence, a cheaper backstop will always lead 
to less pollution, as long as the backstop cost is not prohibitively high.  
 
Assume that besides capture it is also possible to adapt to climate damages. This doesn’t take place by 
investing in adaptation capital (see Tsur and Withagen (2013) and Zemel (2014)), but we assume that 
it occurs through a flow of money outlays ( ),yc y t  where ( )y t  is the adaptation effort and yc  is the 
average cost, assumed constant, and hence equal to marginal cost.  
Damages from the accumulation of atmospheric CO2 are given by the function ˆ( , )h Z y . As long as 
there is no adaptation ( 0y = ) this function equals function h  of the previous sections. We assume 
2
2
ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )ˆ ˆ( , ) 0, ( , ) 0, for all ( , ) 0,z zz
h Z y h Z yh Z y h Z y Z y
Z Z
∂ ∂
= > = > >
∂ ∂
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2
2
ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )ˆ ˆ( , ) 0, ( , ) 0, for all ( , ) 0,y yy
h Z y h Z yh Z y h Z y Z y
y y
∂ ∂
= < = > >
∂ ∂
 
2 ˆ( , )ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ) 0, for all ( , ) 0.yz zy
h Z yh Z y h Z y Z y
Z y
∂
= = < >
∂ ∂
 
ˆDefine ( ) lim ( , ). Then ( ) 0, '( ) 0, ''( ) 0 for all 0.yh Z h Z y h Z h Z h Z Z↑∞≡ > > > >
   
 
 
The social planner’s objective is to maximize  
0
ˆ[ ( ( )) ( ( ), ( )) ( ) ( )]t a ye u x t h Z t y t c a t c y t dt
ρ
∞
− − − −∫ ,  
subject to (1)-(5). For the sake of clarity we now denote the constant marginal cost of capture by ac . 
Among the necessary conditions for optimality we have the minimization of damage cost and 
adaptation cost. This is the first step: to derive the optimal adaptation spending as a function of the 
existing CO2 stock. For a fixed 0Z > , a necessary condition for the minimization of ˆ( , ) yh Z y c y+  is 
(13) ˆ ˆ( , ) 0, 0, ( ( , ) ) 0.y y y yh Z y c y y h Z y c− − ≤ ≥ + =  
Hence, if 0y >  then ˆ ( , )y yh Z y c− = . If ˆ ( ,0)y yh Z c− <  then 0.y =  So, if the marginal benefit of the 
reduction of damage at zero adaptation is smaller than its marginal cost, then no adaptation will take 
place. Figure 4 below depicts the optimal abatement expenditures as a function of the existing CO2 
stock ( )y Z . Let us define the threshold yZ  by ˆ ( ,0)y y yh Z c− =  and let us assume that 0.yZ >  Then 
( ) 0y Z =  for all 0 yZ Z≤ ≤  and ( ) 0, '( ) 0y Z y Z> >  for all .yZ Z>  Note that ( )y Z  is continuous at 
yZ Z=  but not differentiable.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
We may also define the net damage function by ˆ( ) ( , ( )) ( ).yh Z h Z y Z c y Z≡ +  We are essentially back 
in the model analysed in the previous sections, since ( )h Z  has the same properties as the function 
( )h Z , except possibly for differentiability. As a further illustration let us consider an example. 
Assume  
2
ˆ( , )
2( )y y
Zh Z y c y c y
y
ϑ
ϕ
+ = +
+
.  
Hence, 
2 y
y
c
Z ϕ
ϑ
=  and 
0,y =
2
ˆ( ) ( , )
2y
Zh Z h Z y c y ϑ
ϕ
≡ + =  and (´ ) Zh Z ϑ
ϕ
=  if yZ Z< . 
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0,y > ˆ( ) ( , ) 2y y yh Z h Z y c y Z c cϑ ϕ≡ + = +  and (´ ) 2 yh Z cϑ=  if yZ Z> . 
Marginal damages are linear initially and then become constant. Let us now make a distinction 
between two cases 
Case a.  
2 y
a
c
c
ϑ
ρ α
>
+
 
Hence, (´ ) / ( )ac h Z α ρ≥ +  for all 0Z ≥ . In case a CCS cost is higher than the maximal marginal 
damages from atmospheric CO2. Hence, CCS is expensive relative to adaptation and will never be 
deployed. The formal argument runs as follows. Suppose 0a >  along some interval of time. Then, 
along that interval, a xa ac cλ γ= + ≥ . We also have ( ) '( ).h Zλ ρ α λ= + −   Moreover, 
'( ) 2 ( )y ah Z c cϑ ρ α≤ < +  so that ( )( ) 0acλ ρ α λ> + − > . Hence λ  increases, so that also xaγ  
increases and there is full capture. This will never come to an end because of the continuity of λ . But 
this contradicts that eventually we are in the Tahvonen economy with zero capture at low enough 
pollution stocks. Hence, the optimum is characterized by adaptation prevailing as long as the pollution 
stock is high, whereas there will be no adaptation if it gets below a certain threshold. CCS is never 
used, because it is outperformed by adaptation. 
Case b. 
2 y
a
c
c
ϑ
ρ α
<
+
 
The solution Z  of (´ ) /( )ac h Z ρ α= +  satisfies .yZ Z<  This Z  equals the Z  defined in the previous 
section because (´ ) '( )h Z h Z=  for yZ Z≤ . Let us consider several possibilities. 
Suppose * .Z Z>   Then CCS is cheap according to the old definition: CCS will be used if the 
technology would become available in the resource abundant economy’s steady state. Moreover, CCS 
is cheap relative to adaptation. We can reproduce figure 3 and insert yZ  on the vertical axis. This 
yields figure 5. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
The existence of the adaptation option is mainly reflected in the slope of the G-curve, the curve along 
which there was indifference between full and zero capture. Clearly, any path that is optimal in the 
economy without the adaptation option and that has ( ) yZ t Z≤  for all 0t ≥  is also optimal in the 
economy with the adaptation option, because this option is not used. Next, consider optimal paths 
without adaptation where there is no capture at all, but where the CO2 stock is larger than yZ  at some 
instant of time. This holds for example if we would start at the old G-curve at a point with 0 yZ Z> . 
With the adaptation option in place, it would be used, and, of course, carbon capture will never be 
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optimal. Finally, consider optimal paths in the economy without the adaptation option that will start 
with full capture and have a CO2 stock is larger than yZ  at some instant of time. This holds for 
example if we start to the right of the old G-curve with 0 yZ Z> . The aim of the economy is to reduce 
the CO2 stock as quickly as possible, in order to reduce damages. In the new situation there will be 
adaptation initially This mitigates the damages and therefore also the need to reduce the CO2 stock. 
Hence, typically, there will be full capture initially, but for a shorter period of time than before. 
Another way of looking at this is to say that the G-curve becomes steeper. To illustrate this, let us fix 
the initial resource stock and assume that we are in an initial state on the old G-curve. Then there is 
zero capture throughout. In order to have full capture initially, we need a higher initial CO2 stock, i.e. 
we need to be in a point above the G-curve, for the same initial resource stock.  
Also the F-curve, the path that has full capture and leads to ( , )MWZ X  , changes. Note, first of all, that 
MWX  may change itself. Recall that MWX  is defined as the initial state from where it is optimal to 
have zero capture forever and an initial increase of the CO2 stock at the same time, assuming 0 .Z Z=   
We have '( ) /( )MW ah Z cλ α ρ= + = . It could well be that the curve starting in ( , )
MWZ X   has ( ) yZ t Z>  
at some instant of time. If so, total discounted marginal damages will be smaller than ac , so that the 
new MWX  is larger. The shift to the right is then needed to have total discounted marginal damages 
equal to ac . But, let us assume for the sake of exposition that 
MWX  is unaffected by the adaptation 
option. Of course, there is a path with full capture leading to ( , )MWZ X  . This is still the F-curve in 
figure 3. However, starting from a point 0 0( , )Z X  on the F-curve with 0 yZ Z> , it is optimal now to 
switch to zero capture after MWX  is reached, hence to cross the (new) G-curve. 
Suppose, as a final case, * .Z Z<   Here CCS is expensive, but still cheaper than adaptation. Essentially 
we have the same result as in proposition 2. There will never be partial capture. Zero capture prevails 
for small enough CO2 stocks and full capture for large enough CO2 stocks. The effect of adaptation is 
a reduction of the time for which full capture is needed. 
 
Concluding this section, we can say that adaptation can easily be included in our CCS framework. It 
leads to a different specification of the damage function. In our setting the decisions on CCS and 
adaptation can be separated in the sense that the adaptation strategy can be decided upon 
independently of the CCS strategy. The analysis of optimal CCS can then be conducted along the lines 
of the previous section. We generally find that CCS efforts need to be less strong in the presence of 
adaptation. 
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5. Conclusions  
In this paper we have given a full account of optimal CCS under alternative assumptions regarding 
capture cost in the case of an abundant stock of fossil fuels, that cause emissions of CO2. It has been 
shown that depending on initial conditions and the specification of capture costs optimal policies may 
differ considerably. In the most realistic case of marginal capture cost bounded far away from zero, no 
capture is warranted at all. Otherwise, we might have full capture initially, if the initial CO2 stock is 
high. But eventually capture is partial. If exhaustibility is taken into account, in this case of bounded 
marginal capture cost, the picture changes. Optimal capture is zero eventually. Hence, any regime with 
partial capture comes to an end within finite time. With a high initial CO2 stock it is optimal to have 
full use of CCS. The general picture that arises for the, most realistic, cases where the marginal 
capture costs is bounded from below, is that the CO2 stock is inverted-U shaped. With a large initial 
resource stock it will initially increase, CSS is not used, then CCS is used partially, whereas in a final 
phase no capture will take place. With constant marginal capture cost, the CO2 stock is stabilized at a 
certain level as long as partial capture takes place, but then definitely the CO2 stock increases for a 
period of time before approaching zero in the end. Compared with a world where for one reason or 
another an exogenous upper bound is set for the pollution stock, we find that, if we would put such an 
upper bound in addition to the damage function, it is well possible to have CCS use before the upper 
bound is reached.  
The implementation of the first-best outcome in a decentralized economy is simple, at least from a 
theoretical perspective. If the resource extracting sector is competitive and also generates the energy 
needed by the consumers and owns the CCS technology, then it suffices to impose a carbon tax 
corresponding with marginal damage, evaluated in the optimum. If the extractive sector, the energy 
generating sector and the CCS sector are distinct industries, then the same tax needs to be imposed on 
the energy generating sector.  
We have also paid attention to adaptation. It has been shown that adaptation can be represented by 
modifying the damage function in a straightforward way. Optimal adaptation can be decided upon 
independently of optimal deployment of CCS. We find that adaptation makes full scale CCS less 
desirable, in the sense that full CCS is needed for a shorter period of time, at least if adaptation is not 
prohibitively costly. We have identified a condition for which adaptation is a better option than CCS.  
 
Future research on a large number of issues is in order. A crucial question is where the world’s actual 
initial position is. It should be possible to accurately assess the amount of CO2 that is in the 
atmosphere at present, as well as the CO2 in the crust of the earth. But, to take the simple case of 
constant marginal CCS cost amounting to approximately $60, we then still need to specify the global 
damage function and the estimates of marginal damages vary considerably among studies. Related to 
this is the fact the CCS and also some types of adaptation require large set up cost, that we haven’t 
taken into account here. Moreover, the model we consider lacks the complexity of the real world. We 
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have treated energy as a commodity that yields utility directly, whereas it should play a role in 
production rather than in consumption. For the description of the carbon cycle, we have followed an 
approach that is well established in economics, but, as we have stressed before (see footnote 9), that 
could be modified according to new insights from climatologists, according to which part of current 
emissions stay in the atmosphere indefinitely. With an abundant resource this would not lead to 
outcomes that qualitatively differ from what we found in section 3. We also conjecture that our results 
go through in case of decay being a strictly increasing and strictly convex function of the existing 
pollution stock. See Toman and Withagen (2000) on clean technologies and concavity of the self-
regeneration function. Another topic for further research concerns the fact that marginal capture cost 
may be small, but that in order to set up an installation close to the plants that generate CO2, may be 
costly.  
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Appendix A. Definitions of CO2 thresholds. 
*Z  solves '( )'( ) .Z h Zu α ζ
ζ α ρ
=
+
 
Z  solves '( ) '(0).h Z c
α ρ
=
+
 
ˆ ˆ( , )Z a  solves '( )'( ) '( ).Z a h Zu c aα
ζ α ρ
+
= =
+
 
For aZ Z<  capture is zero. 
For mZ Z>  there is full capture. 
For a mZ Z Z< <  there is partial capture. 
For yZ Z<  there is no adaptation. 
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For yZ Z>  there is adaptation. 
 
Appendix B. Figures 
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Figure 2: Phase diagram. Case and abundant non-
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